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I.

Purpose of the Research

One infrequently studied problem in the natural hazards area
is the secondary effects of flooding with respect to hazardous
materials. During a flood, hazardous materials incidents can occur
but may be overlooked because of concerns with the primary disaster
impacts.
These incidents may occur in a variety of ways.
Old
hazardous materials "dump" sites may be undermined and chemicals
spread by flood waters. The integrity of underground tanks which
store hazardous materials (e. g., gasoline or oil supplies) may
similarly pose a threat. Barrels of stored chemicals or wastes can
be moved by simply floating away and, since many of these
containers are not labeled, they may constitute an unknown level of
hazard.
Unexpected hazardous materials problems could emerge in
the post-impact period. Lafornara et ale (1978) cite such hazards
in their work on the Johnstown Flood.
They show that food
distributing facilities may face high bacterial counts and
hazardous chemicals if their refrigeration systems fail. Gases may
collect in the area, causing explosions. Commercial establishments
and households that store chemicals pose another threat.
containers may be damaged in the flood, leaving their contents to
leak and mix with other chemicals. Also, gases from ruptured tanks
or pipelines could accumulate in sewer systems and cause
explosions.
Secondary hazardous materials hazards also occurred during a
January, 1992 hurricane. The Sunday News Journal of Wilmington, DE
(A-1) reported that, "Rising water caused several heating oil tanks
to overflow in Bowers Beach ... [Director] of the Delaware Division
of Air and Waste Management said crews would begin to clean up the
oil soon. Environmental officers were also investigating a report
of leaking jet fuel in the water off Port Mahon." This incident
reinforces that secondary hazardous materials hazards are a recent
and serious concern.
Few studies have been completed on this very important problem
regarding the potential secondary effects on health, safety,
property and the physical environment.
Tierney (1980, 1982) has
done work on applying the lessons learned in natural disaster
response to hazardous materials response. One factor stressed was
that communities should be undertaking a planning process, not
generating documents based on "model" plans.
The objective of this study is to examine the organizational
response to hazardous materials incidents after flooding with
regard to the regulations, procedures, and planning that governed
affected localities.
The problem was framed in terms of
organizational
theory.
Organizational
theory
holds
that
organizational actions are affected by the dynamics of both
internal and external (or environmental) forces.
Organizational
boundaries and constraints act upon the ability of the organization
to accomplish tasks. In this paper, I will describe the hazardous
1

materials hazards that occurred in one case study of flooding and
how organizations handled them.
II.

Research Questions

The following research questions drove this study:

* Are sites routinely tested after a major
assumption made that no incidents occurred?

flood

or

is

the

* Are there criteria which determine whether or not tests will be
done?

* Must testing be performed within
effectively mitigate damages?

a

time

limit

in

order to

*
*

Are there factors that facilitate or inhibit testing?

*

Do concerned calls from the pUblic facilitate response?

*

Does a lack of accessibility to sites hinder tasks?

Are testing materials and equipment vulnerable to flood damage?

* Are the employees who test the sites in the area after the flood
to do their jobs?

* Are there higher risks to employees involved in checking sites
after a flood than in normal times?
* Must hazardous materials responders obtain clearance to test a
site? If so, is the authority which grants the clearance available
after the flood?
*

At what point do higher officials become involved in the locallevel response?

* Is there differential
hazardous materials?

response

or

attention

to

*

Is the public notified of hazards or vulnerabilities?

*

At what point is the pUblic warned or evacuated?

* In normal times, how much attention is given to
floodplains when hazardous materials sites are chosen?

different

avoiding

* Is there consensus on what kind of hazardous materials response
will take place after a flood?
*

Are officials aware of what actions are mandated under laws and
2

regulations?

* Are those involved in the overall community emergency response
aware of or concerned about the hazardous materials risks?
* In the response period, do any sites, situations or practices
become problems that were not foreseen in planning?
*

How are unforseen hazards handled?

As evidenced from the research questions, this study was
intended to examine the nature of the planning and response for
hazardous materials hazards after flooding.
These questions were
designed to explore whether involved parties anticipated potential
hazardous materials hazards and viewed them as valid concerns.
III.

Methodology

The research strategy suitable for this problem was that of
face-to-face interviews conducted with an open-ended interview
schedule (APPENDIX A).
Contacts in the field were treated as
"informants" for their organizations.
First, key actors in the
organizations undertaking the community response to the flood were
interviewed. Agencies in which interviews were undertaken include
1)
fire departments, 2) police departments, and 3) emergency
management agencies.
Interviews with the informants were used to
understand the general processes of the organizational response to
the flood.
Second, interviews were conducted with those who have
duties with hazardous materials in normal time~ such as those
working with environmental regulation enforcement ~ Such informants
provided background information concerning state regulations which
governed hazardous materials responses, plus information about the
quick-response hazardous materials work that was necessary.
In
all, eighteen face-to-face interviews were conducted.
Lastly,
document analysis of plans and records was also employed in order
to give greater context and verification to the interview
materials.
The following criteria were used to determine the selection of
the research site:
1) the locality had sites where hazardous
materials were present; and 2) there were hazardous materials
responders for the area who were locally based.
Field work was
undertaken as soon as it was possible to gain entrance into the
flooded area.
It was important to arrive as quickly as possible.
The more time that passes between the event and an interview, the
more likely it is that informants have experienced retelling and
social constructions of "truth."
Since the field work was
undertaken quickly, the event was fresh in the respondents' minds.
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IV.

Description of the Flooding Event

A serious flooding incident in the southern united states
occurred in the spring of 1991 and served as the research site for
this study.
The flooding, due to torrential rain, was mainly
confined to one state. The rain ensued for about one month, from
early April to early May.
Initially, the first wave of rains
impacted the northeastern region of the state. One local newspaper
in that region reported that 1,371 homes were damaged. Temporary
housing costs were expected to be $900,000. By May 10, 1991, the
state's major northeastern city had received 44.42 inches of rain,
surpassing its average annual rainfall total of 43.8 inches at the
earliest date in recorded history.
This was very unusual as the
city's average rainfall would be 17.2" at that time of the year.
A second wave of rains inundated the north central and northeastern
regions.
A total of 3,913 homes were damaged there.
Temporary
housing costs for those regions were expected to be $3.5 million.
Successively, 17 counties across the northern part of the state
were declared federal disaster areas.
This enabled residents to
apply for state and federal loans and grants for damages. Grants
to individual homeowners were expected to total $9.2 million.
In
total, 5,284 homes were flooded, resulting in an estimated $46
million in damages.
Though the northern part of the state is largely low river
basin land that has a substantial history of flooding, this was not
just another flood.
This event qualified as a one-hundred year
flood, as areas that usually do not become inundated were under
water. In some areas, it was considered a five-hundred year event.
The only comparable event in the northern region occurred in the
1950s, and this deluge surpassed it.
Respondents in a major
northeastern city noted one particular bench mark of this flood's
importance. The river running through the city reached the level
of the city's railroad bridge. The river's crest of 50.2 feet had
surpassed the record set in the early 1950s.
This was seen as
proof that the flood was indeed an unusual event.
Compounding the situation in the northeast, a serious
explosion occurred at a chemical plant while surrounding areas were
still under water.
The plant was located on the bank of an
overflowing river and was just miles away from flooded communities.
The plant was located within the city limits of a small town of
1500 residents, all of whom were evacuated. Chemical contamination
of the air resulting from the plant explosion was a prevalent
concern and one reason for the evacuation.
Field work investigating the above events was undertaken in
early May,
1991.
Interviews were completed at different
governmental and organizational levels in several jurisdictions
across the northern part of the state. In this study, details were
obtained about the hazardous materials related incidents that
occurred.
Further ideas were also explored about incidents that
4

could potentially occur, but did not, as a result of this case of
flooding.

v.

organizations Involved in Flooding and Hazardous Materials
Incidents

A brief description of the organizations at this research site
that are involved in flooding and hazardous materials incidents is
needed for a complete understanding of the response to the events.
The state regulatory agencies are key actors in hazardous
materials incidents.
Recently, because of high-level political
support, the state environmental regulatory agency was created, and
drastically expanded upon functions that had previously been
undertaken in other agencies.
New laws also empowered them with
substantial enforcement capabilities.
The state environmental
regulatory
agency
is
responsible
for
enforcing
pollution
regulations and laws on a variety of counts.
That agency is
divided into several sections that each have a specific function.
There is a specific section to control the operation of underground
storage tanks, water quality, air quality, solid waste, hazardous
materials, and hazardous waste, for example.
The agency also
employs the quick-response team which responds to hazardous
materials emergencies.
Members of each section and the quickresponse team are located in different regional offices, to ensure
good coverage of the state. The agency was active in investigating
the hazardous materials emergencies described in the next section
and in testing the air and water quality after the chemical
explosion. Another state regulatory body, identified here as the
state resource conservation agency, enforces controls on oil
drilling operations. They establish regulations on how the oil and
gas producers acquire their product and dispose of the associated
wastes, for example.
They, too, operate in different regions of
the state.
City and county fire departments have firefighters trained in
hazardous materials responses.
Departments were involved in the
response to some of the incidents listed in this report and were
active at the chemical explosion. Fire departments can also be the
repository for information required under the federal SARA Title
III mandate, the "community right-to-know" law.
Companies are
required to provide the repository agency with lists of the
chemicals they store on-site and a facility emergency plan to be
used in case of an incident.
In the case of the chemical
explosion, the county fire department held the documents.
Police entities at different governmental levels basically
perform the same function.
They are to provide security to
emergency sites such as the flooded areas or chemical plant, in
this case.
Their mission is also to control crowds and evacuate
people. Some entities, such as the state police, have a cadre of
5

officers trained in hazardous materials response. Those units act
as first responders to various kinds of hazardous materials
incidents, including spills on the highways.
These officers are
assigned to each region to ensure coverage of the state.
VI.

Hazardous Materials Incidents, Responses and Procedures

Displacement of Underground storage Tanks
Incidents
six underground storage tanks (USTs) floated out of their tank
holds at four different locations during the flooding. These six
incidents occurred in the northeastern region, which contains a
total of 3,000 tanks at 1,100 facilities. The northwestern region
contains approximately 1,300 tanks but had no incidents.
All of
the affected locations were convenience stores that used the tanks
for gasoline storage.
Such incidents occur when the water table builds up underneath
the tank pad. The pad is usually made up of coarse materials such
as peat gravel or sand so it acts as a conduit for water.
Since
gasoline is lighter than water, it also helps the tank float up.
As it rises, it pUlls the connection lines.
This could cause a
breakage in the product line and gasoline could be lost to the
environment.
The first case involved two tanks that were full of gasoline.
They were in the process of being installed and workers were
preparing to "tightness test" the tanks.
There was only a sandy
backfill on the top of the tanks at that point. When the tank pit
collected storm water runoff, the tanks popped up. No gasoline was
lost.
In a second case, a 10,000 gallon tank 15% full of product
surfaced.
It had only been under earthen cover, so when the roof
of a nearby building drained rainwater into the tank hold, it rose.
The tank's rise was aided by the fact that it only held 1500
gallons, so it was very light. Fortunately, it did not appear to
lose any product.
The third case occurred at a facility being
prepared for closure. The concrete over two tanks had been broken
in preparation for the removal of the tanks and all product had
been removed.
When the rain ensued, rain water flowed into the
concrete hole and both tanks surfaced. Since the tanks were empty,
this incident was not problematic.
The fourth case involved an
8,000 gallon tank under earthen cover.
It was empty except for
some possible residual amount of 20-40 gallons.
In this case, it
is not clear why the tank surfaced since the facility was on a hill
above the water table. Possibly, rainwater percolated through the
sandy backfill and soil and filled up around the tank. Responders
observed that the tank's product line was seriously bent but not
ruptured.
still, there could have been some product lost in this
incident, as there appeared to be gasoline floating in the water.
6

Such a conclusion is more complicated, though.
The lost product
that was observed could have been as a result of spillage and
overfill that took place at that tank hold in the past.
Response
A state environmental regulatory agency respondent explained
that the tank owner must call the fire marshall's office (because
of the fire hazard), the state police, and the UST section of the
state environmental regulatory agency (responsible for the clean
operation of the tanks) when incidents occur.
The regulatory
agency initially treats it as an emergency situation, and a field
inspector quickly responds to the scene in order to remove the
tanks and proceed with closure.
That way, if any product is
present it can be remediated without serious permanent damage. The
inspector determines whether it is an emergency situation or not
only after arrival on-site. After the inspection, the owner must
contract a pump service company to close out the tank. The owner
will usually be familiar with the company as they also install and
repair tanks.
Following procedure, the regulatory agency required the
closing out of all six tanks.
The agency respondent explained,
" ... what we'll do as part of our routine UST closure procedure is
have them do some analytical soil testing from beneath the tanks
and that will tell us if we have a problem with contamination in
the immediate area." The usual closure process involves 30 days
notification, but since these were emergency situations, the
process was expedited.
He continued, " ... most of the tanks have
been removed or will be removed in the next day or two. II This time
frame represents up to about a week after they were reported.
Responders had no problem with accessibility to the tanks
because of the flood. The field inspector asked one tank owner the
best route to take to get to the site, since some roads were closed
because of flooding. Good information was received and no problems
were encountered in getting to the facility.
Also, the pump
service companies were available to work on the tanks, even more so
than usual because the bad weather had shut down their current
proj ects.
Also, since the four tank incidents were deemed
emergencies, the regulatory agency and pump service companies
dropped what they were doing and attended to the situations. There
were no problems with equipment, which is portable, and could be
protected from the floodwaters.
concerning workload,
the
regulatory
agency
respondent
explained that, "we're overwhelmed before the flood and after the
flood. II
Low bUdgets have always prevented the hiring of an
adequate number of people to deal with the oversight of an entire
region. The flood just exacerbated this normal condition.
7

Experience, Preparedness, and Mitigation
Most of the state regulatory agency's work is done on a case
by case basis. Two agency respondents reported that the surfacing
of USTs is a rare occurrence that has only happened incidentally in
the past.
Precautions that can be taken before flooding include making
sure the fill caps and fittings on top of the tank are tight.
A
regulatory agency respondent further advises that "sand bags can be
placed on top of the tank hold areas, probably some on top of the
fill ports and maybe some for ballast. They may put some sandbags
around them to try to keep the oil back from around the fill
point." He warns that there may be several inches of water sitting
on top of the concrete, which is on top of the tanks themselves.
The respondent noted that the pump service companies told him that
they spoke to their clients about precautions before the flooding.
They advised that, " ... if you have any facilities that look like
they're gonna flood, make sure you do these things, make sure your
tank is topped off ... and keep your tanks topped off, make sure your
fill ports are good and tight, the caps, so you don't take on the
oil. "
The respondent reported that a formal plan for outlining
precautions did not exist. He said that the precautions taken were
the result of the pump service companies' good thinking about
potential problems.
Mitigation can be undertaken in the installation phase by
strapping the tank down.
Retrofitting the tank once it is in
place is very difficult. Strapping the tank is desirable in flood
prone or shallow water table areas.
A concrete pad is poured at
the base of the tank hole. The tanks would then be put in on top
of the pad, and metal straps secured across the tank.
The tank
would then be anchored in place.
Regulation of USTs in Normal times
There are two kinds of USTs, chemical USTs and petroleum USTs,
which are both regulated by the state.
There are very few (less
than 10) chemical USTs in the northeastern part of the state, but
many are used by industry in the southern part. Petroleum USTs are
used by retail fuel distributers but also by industries, which keep
them to fuel their fleet vehicles and generators.
Normally, if a leak is suspected at a UST, a soil sample is
taken.
If the sample shows contamination and evidence that
gasoline or another chemical has filtrated into the groundwater
supply, then a site assessment is done.
One state environmental
regulatory agency respondent explained, "We go out and look at the
entire area to determine the extent of the damage.
That would
involve a series of soil bores to the groundwater table and
installation of groundwater monitoring wells. That usually doesn't
8

occur as a result of tanks floating up."
There is a good working relationship between the pump service
contractors and the state environmental regulatory agency.
The
companies cooperate by reporting leaks from USTs.
state law
requires that a person aware of a leak from a UST must report it in
24 hours.
Anyone can be held responsible for failure to report.
The pump service contractors report more leaks than the owners
themselves.
In normal times, the major oil companies are the group that is
most in compliance with regulations concerning the proper operation
of USTs. They want to keep a favorable corporate profile so they
stay current with the laws. The ones that are the most affected by
the laws are the small company owners, and the individual tank
owners.
For instance, the "mom and pop" grocery store owners
usually aren't aware of the state regulations governing USTs. When
the state undertakes a routine inspection of their tanks and finds
out they are not in compliance, the owners are usually not aware of
the fact.
When they realize the costs of upgrading to be in
compliance, they close the system down.

Actual and Potential Incidents at oil Fields Regarding Reserve
Pits, Tanks and Wells
The most evident impact from rain and flooding on the oil and
gas business is that it slows down. Locations become inaccessible,
equipment can't be moved since the ground is soggy, and wells are
taken over by water.
The rising water causes more of a problem
than rain. The northeastern part of the state was investigated for
oil well problems concerning hazardous materials.
In this area,
there were 300 fields, some small and s'ome large, containing
30,000-40,000 wells.
Small, independent companies operate these
wells, as opposed to the "majors" such as Exxon, Mobil and Chevron.
Responses
The state resource conservation agency for oil fields reported
that a few wells had to be shut in because the flooding would make
them inaccessible.
An agency respondent said that when the
operators of the oil wells, the "pumpers", see that the location is
getting too wet, they relocate the oil that they have already
extracted.
This entails trucking out the oil that is usually
stored in a 210-barrel tank on the lease. The pumpers usually know
the history of their wells, which can be 50-60 years old, and can
tell which will be affected by flooding. They know they need to go
shut them down and drain the tanks, or put water in the tanks and
balance them to prevent them from tipping because of the rising
water.
Because of the rain, the pumpers were watching for
9

problems, the resource conservation agency respondent said.
He
added, though, that some pumpers might not aware of the flooding
hazards, and tanks could have toppled over.
The state resource conservation agency had reports of drilling
pits and reserve pit muds being inundated. The muds were leaking
through natural drainage, but normally are not released into the
environment.
As a well is being drilled, the cuttings from the
earth are circulated into a large pit about 100' x 200' and 6-8'
deep. In three instances, flash flood waters in creeks rose above
their banks and inundated these pits. Some of the contents flowed
out as a result. Most of the products associated with oil and gas
are non-hazardous oil field waste. These drilling muds are not as
harmful to the environment as are the oil and salt water extracted
in the process.
Even saltwater and oil are considered nonhazardous wastes by the state regulatory agency in this context.
Potential hazards are contingent on what else the oil and gas
operators are doing in practice, for instance, if they have anticorrosion well treating chemicals they are injecting into the mUd.
If a 55-gallon drum containing such a chemical was open, and
flipped over and leaked, it could be a problem.
It could
contaminate flood or ground waters and a cleanup would be
necessary. The resource conservation agency respondent noted that
smaller operators could have a barrel sitting on the lease and if
water got to it, that could happen.
A case such as that would
probably go unreported, however.
As far as response to the reserve pit problem, once reported,
an inspector from the state resource conservation agency will go
out and document the case by completing an inspection report.
Notes will be made so that next time, a pit won't be located in the
flooded area.
Initially, when the drilling rig moves into a
location, the operator is to assess the best location for the pit.
It must be remembered, though, that when there is a one-hundred
flood such as this event, there will be pit overflows that were not
expected.
The resource conservation agency respondent noted that "I'm
sure there are some well heads underwater."
A well head might
extend 4-8 feet above ground but wells are a closed system that are
not prone to leaks at the well head.
oil travels to the surface
through lines to the storage tanks.
It is a closed system until
there is a leak in the tank or the tank flips.
A well head
sUbmerged is not a problem.
Accessibility to the oil field installations is a problem in
flooding events, so it cannot be known if there are spills on a
lease.
Neither resource conservation agency responders or
operators can get to the locations. One environmental regulatory
agency respondent notes that it is useful to remember, though, that
any leak would be diluted to a great extent by the floodwaters.
10

Mitigation and Experience
There has been experience with these problems before. Many of
oil and gas operators are located near the banks of one large
northeast river. One year before the event, in another flood, the
river overflowed its banks into an operating area.
Two spills
occurred, both similar in nature. In one of the incidents, a 210barrel tank 1/4 full of oil became buoyant and turned over.
Between the two tanks, about 20-30 barrels of oil spilled.
All
tanks are open at the top as a vent, so the contents spilled out
the top.
There were reports of the oil on the water, as it is
noticeable as the oil spreads out very thinly. By the time these
incidents are reported, the product is usually down the river and
dispersed so there is not much that can be done.
Because of these experiences, the resource conservation agency
respondent said that the county emergency manager and he learned
their lessons and took action. They taught operators that if there
was a threat of high water again, they should either empty their
tanks or fill them with water.
Water can be added to the 0 i 1
without separating it, and is needed to weigh down the tank so it
so it does not become buoyant.
This precautionary advice was
spread through the resource conservation agency's file room.
As
the operators came in, they were told to do these procedures.
There is good rapport between the agency and the operators, and
they frequently go over procedures.
For instance, the agency
respondent noted that in the event of an oil or salt water spill,
the operators know that the resource conservation agency and the
state police must be contacted.

Interruption of Cleanups in Progress
Flooding and heavy rain interrupted the following ongoing
hazardous materials cleanups in progress.
1.

Mitigation at a Boat Dock Cleanup

One cleanup operation that was disrupted involved a gasoline
line leading to a boat dock that had sprung a leak.
The leak
occurred on the edge of the lake and the soil had to be excavated
as it was contaminated with gasoline. So far in the operation, the
line was excavated. Workers had already started to remediate that
area by removing and replacing the line and removing the
contaminated soils. When the rain began, the lake started to rise.
The operation had to be delayed because of the high water, which
flooded the area that was excavated. That is where the job stood
as a state environmental regulatory agency respondent replied,
"until the lake begins to subside."
Precautions were taken to
avoid any further damage to the site. The area was barricaded with
11

a petroleum absorbent boom to prevent any gasoline from reaching
the lake.
2.

Interruption of a Battery Acid Cleanup

There was another incident where severe weather increased a
hazardous materials hazard, although there was no flooding
involved. The ongoing cleanup involved a vehicle that was carrying
a load of electrical storage batteries for electrically operated
vehicles such as golf carts and go carts.
The acid that was
leaking from the batteries was of concern. Any water that hit the
affected area could cause dilution of the battery acid and
contaminate runoff.
Fortunately,
because the cleanup had
progressed far enough, that situation did not occur. The job was
virtually complete before the bad weather struck.
The bad weather hal ted the cleanup for about 30 minutes.
Everything was very quickly secured and workers returned to their
vehicles to check the weather report. Fortunately, the worst part
of the storm did not go through the area of the cleanup. The crew
got back out and finished the cleanup.
Concerning the initial response to the incident, the quickresponse hazardous materials team,
contractors,
and
other
responders
did not
experience accessibility problems when
responding to the site.

Airplane Hanger Event Resulting from Heavy Rains and Wind
A weather-related hazardous materials incident took place at
a local regional airport. Due to winds that were between 85 and 90
mph, one of the hangers collapsed. Some of the aircraft that were
trapped inside had to be removed in an environmentally safe manner,
so that no fuel was allowed to leak.
Parties moved to avoid a potential leak.
A contractor was
called to remove the craft. Also, fire departments and the state
hazardous materials quick-response team were notified.
The
operation was very tedious because of the bad weather, which
continued throughout the process. The operation was completed
without any environmental impact. One respondent from the quickresponse team suggested that luck was on their side, as the outcome
could have been worse. Since the weather had gotten so bad, most
of the cleanup crews in the area around the airport had stopped
working.
That meant that they were available to respond to this
particular situation. Another benefit was that there normally is
good coverage for environmental cleanups in this area by private
companies.
One particular crew kept on working and finished the
job in a safe manner. There was no problem with workers not being
12

able to respond to the site. The company was able to quickly get
to the location without any accessibility problems, and was even
there before the hazardous materials quick-response team.

Inundation of Landfills as a Result of Flooding
The northwestern region contains at least 8 landfills and 75100 surface impoundments (operated at industrial facilities).
There were problems with the inundation of one landfill which
accepts industrial and municipal refuse, but not hazardous waste.
The problems arose because of rain water rather than rising flood
waters. There was no problem with accessibility to the site, and
two people from the state environmental regulatory agency, one from
the solid waste section, the other from the water quality section,
inspected the landfill at different times. The piping at the site
was not adequate to remove the eight million gallons of water that
were entering. The storm water came in contact with cover material
in two cells of the landfill, but not with waste. A six foot boom
was laid to segregate the contaminated water.
Permission was
granted to use a portable pump to discharge water off-site.
Whenever a landfill or surface impoundment deviates from their
discharge permit, they must notify the water quality section.
In
this case, an accidental discharge permit was granted by the water
quality section.
The state environmental regulatory agency's solid waste
section has only permitted these landfills and surface impoundments
to include flood standards for 5 or 6 years. Approval for design
and construction must be granted by the section before the facility
is built.
This is the only time that precautions can be taken.
The facility must employ structural mitigation to withstand
inundation from a twenty-five year or one-hundred year flood,
depending on location.
The regulations also state that the plan
for the facility must be signed by the Core of Engineers to ensure
that it is not located in a flood prone area.
In the past, the
regulatory process halted the construction of one landfill because
it was found to be in a flood prone area. Routine inspections also
help keep the facilities in check.
All landfills are inspected
quarterly, while surface impoundments are inspected semi-annually.
Unfortunately, as changes in drainage occur from increased
development of roads and neighborhoods , facilities may flood.
Usually such changes are gradual and the effects can be recognized
before a major incident occurs.

Inundation of Sewage Systems and Wastewater Treatment Plants
Several municipal sewage treatment systems were inundated by
the flood.
They were the source of most of the sewage problems.
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Refineries which operate their own wastewater treatment systems and
have treatment ponds on-site were also inundated by flooding.
Since their ponds are located at the lowest elevation on the plant
grounds to ensure flow by gravity, they are easily flooded.
A
number of spills occurred at one refinery, which had a history of
flooding after heavy rain.
Calls to the state environmental regulatory agency water
quality section from residents concerned about water contamination
doubled or tripled during the flood, a respondent in that section
reported. Tests for drinking water contamination from sewage are
mainly the responsibility of the state health department (as
addressed in the next section), but the water quality section also
checks the waters.
The section planned to investigate the
situation during their next regularly scheduled check, instead of
an emergency check.
Accessibility problems due to closed roads
were preventing water quality personnel from getting into some of
the flooded areas right away.
Precautions to be taken for the sewage and wastewater problem
are few. One water quality section respondent commented that there
was not much one could do about the problem except to document that
it had occurred. He noted that there is little that can be done,
"not when they're inundated 7 feet."
It wasn't justifiable or
possible to "spend double the money" to protect sites that may not
even be in such a rare one-hundred year flood. He did mention that
the formulation of a plan for downstream sampling of floodwater
could be useful. Concerning municipal sewage treatment problems,
another water quality section respondent noted one precaution that
can be taken so sewage stations are not overrun.
In some low
areas, manholes have been elevated so water cannot invade them as
quickly.
Possible contamination of Wells
Trailer park and
individual wells were
inundated by
floodwaters. When distribution lines become washed out as they did
in this flood, they must be repaired, chlorinated and flushed.
Also, water samples must be taken. Owners were advised on how to
flush the wells, a task that can only be done when the water goes
down. Some areas were inaccessible, so the department had to wait
a few days to follow up on complaints. The state health department
issued voluntary boil orders for several areas.
Past experiences with such inundation have taught the health
department how to effectively carry out boil notices.
The
department now also issues information on food cleanup and health
tips during the flooded conditions.
The department also attends
civil defense department meetings to be updated on preparedness.
In the past, there has been no hazardous materials interaction with
wells due to flooding, but a spill of hazardous materials has
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entered a well system without flooding present. In that case, the
wells had to be closed and new wells drilled.
A state police
respondent warned that there is always the possibility of harmful
chemicals in the soil drifting into wells, so they must be
monitored if there is a concern.
Inundation of an Automobile Junkyard
During the flooding, there was a problem with a wrecking yard
going under water. The gasoline left in vehicle tanks was spilling
out of the wrecked cars.
Originally, when the cars are brought
into the yard, all fluids are not drained. The oil plus whatever
gas is left in the tank is still in the car.
If the gasoline cap
is removed, when the floodwater inundates the yard, it fills the
tank and the gasoline is released.
The gasoline is lighter than
water, also, so that aids its distribution. A respondent from the
state environmental regulatory agency water quality section noted
that they would have to address that problem in the future as at
present, it is an unregulated activity.

Potential Release of Transformer Fluids in Floodwaters
During the flooding, a resident called the state environmental
regulatory agency and reported that a transformer had been hit by
lightening. A transformer and pole fell on a property adjacent to
the horne of the caller.
The caller was concerned that the water
that was washing across their yard might contain contaminated
material.
The power company involved took care of the incident
quickly and there was no problem with a loss of fluids from the
transformer.
The resident was correct to anticipate such a hazard.
It is
not unusual for a transformer to be struck by lightening, and the
problem with the release of PCB fluids is possible.
In this
particular region,
the majority of transformers have been
remediated in that all of the PCB contaminated transformer oils
have been removed. There are some older transformers still in use,
though, that still have the old configuration. Nevertheless, the
power company would check all transformers that are involved in
such incidents.

Potential for Transportation Related Spills of Hazardous Materials
1.

Barge Accidents on Waterways

A state police respondent warned that barge incidents should
be expected in times of heavy rains and river rise.
In the past,
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there have been such barge incidents in the northeastern region,
but none occurred in this flooding event. The respondent described
an incident where a barge ran into bridge pilings and was turned
over in the river. A city fire department respondent reported an
incident where a barge that was carrying ammonia struck a bridge.
There were some problems with what jurisdiction was responsible for
such an incident on the river. After the event, the county civil
defense director discussed the plan again, which clearly stated
jurisdictional responsibilities.
This was done so it would be
clear what jurisdiction would act as the primary responder in a
future incident.
As
this
case
suggests,
there
could
be
a
hazardous
materials/oil spill associated with such an incident depending on
what kind of chemical the barge was carrying.
According to one
county plan, river traffic is highest on the local river during the
spring and summer months. At that time, there are about 6-8 tows
with 3 barges per tow (6000 tons per barge) of anhydrous ammonia
moved per month. In the winter months, the threat is lessened, but
there are still two tows per month of caustic soda. In case of an
accident of this type, it is the state environmental regulatory
agency water quality section's mandate to test the river water.
The barge accidents are related to high water.
When the
current is swift, tugboats cannot push the heavy barges, which
weigh as much as a few train loads. The work on the tug's engines
increases as the current gets swifter. The state police respondent
remarked that on the day of the interview a barge could not be
allowed to traverse on the river because the water level was so
high. There would be the possibility of damaging a levee as well
if one did attempt the trip.
2.

Trucking Accidents and Associated Spills in Bad Weather

A state police respondent mentioned that trucking accidents,
and their potential associated hazardous materials spills, are more
likely in times of bad weather and flooding.
He reported that in
the northeastern part of the state, on any given day, about 5,00010,000 trucks crossed the interstate scale.
Probably 17-20% of
them would be carrying some kind of chemical.
This fact is
addressed in one county hazardous materials plan studied.
These
respondents emphasize that accidents are not usually flood-related,
but weather-related. Also, more accidents occur when it is raining
than when it is not.
VII.

The Added Threat of a Chemical Plant Explosion

While localities were still enduring flooded conditions,
another disaster event occurred -- an explosion at a chemical plant
which had principally manufactured anhydrous ammonia, an extremely
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toxic substance.
The plant had many other hazardous materials
onsite, according to the county disaster plan's annex on hazardous
materials. Under extremely toxic substances, the plant reported to
have formaldehyde, nitric acid, sulfuric acid and chlorine on-site,
in addition to others.
The facility was in compliance with SARA
Title III requirements; it had filed its appropriate Material
Safety Data Sheets and had also submitted a facility emergency plan
and resource list.
The plant employed approximately four hundred workers, eight
of whom were killed by the blast. Over one hundred employees were
injured by the explosion. The powerful blast shattered windows of
neighboring homes and a school, and downed telephone poles and
trees.
A gas station located across the street from the plant
sustained heavy damages.
The surrounding town of 1500 residents
was evacuated after the explosion because it was not known if the
fire would emit toxic fumes.
The evacuation included a local
hospital which held 20 patients.
Local, state, and federal entities such as the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration and the Environmental Protection
Agency responded to the scene.
Police organizations evacuated
residents, closed roads and controlled access.
Fire departments
added their resources to fight the blaze. The local civil defense
organization also responded and an Emergency operations Center was
established. The state environmental regulatory agency, including
the hazardous materials quick-responders, was on-site to test air
quality and the quality of the runoff water.
Main hazardous materials concerns regarded air quality around
the plant and the quality of the runoff water, which was resulting
from both the internal fire suppression system and the fire
departments. There was initial concern with asbestos being knocked
out of the nearby high school auditorium ceiling.
A plant
representative resolved the issue, though, by meeting with school
board representatives about a management plan for cleanup.
Air
quality around the plant was found to be within acceptable
standards.
with regard to runoff water, although the plant was
designed to contain this water in its own piping system, there were
some problems. One water quality agency respondent explained,
"They lost some of their chemicals when the vessels
exploded ... Their fire system went on immediately spreading
water and the water has to go somewhere.
Since they lost
their power, it went down the storm water drain. We've been
monitoring, taking some samples, as well.
I understand they
had barely reportable quantities of TMP propane and possibly
some formaldehyde problem.
Other than that ... OSHA is not
letting them take the water off, so its water brought on to
the propane tank.
So that's a source of runoff.
So until
that's settled, they're going to have runoff problems.
As
soon as they get the flow down to manage it with the flood,
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they're going to divert it to their treatment system ... " [There
is] a slight organic pollution problem. But again its flowing
into the flooded area and I don't consider it a problem. Its
going to some lake more or less.
The runoff will go into
surface drainage and get into a drainage system. Part of it
goes into the river but since the river's so high, it will
flow back.
You probably couldn't detect it a 1/4 mile from
[the plant], but we're still concerned about it ...
Fortunately,
there was little interaction between the
explosion and the flood. The flood in no way caused the explosion.
Responders did not report any problems in gaining accessibility to
the site because of closed roads or floodwaters. One environmental
regulatory agency air quality section respondent noted, though,
that sections of a major highway were closed because of flooding
only days before the explosion.
The potential for hazardous
materials hazards was also very real. Although the area around the
plant was not under water, plant property was less than a block
away from an overflowing river.
If the river water had been
higher, the response could have been much more difficult to carry
out, and chemical hazards entering this water might have been more
of a concern. There were not hazardous chemical releases into the
floodwaters, although they were anticipated and discussed by
citizens and responders.
One rumor warned about the possibility
that contaminated runoff water could be entering the floodwaters.
This rumor prompted calls from citizens to the environmental
regulatory agency. Another rumor about the explosion warned that
the impact of the blast would weaken a levee and the floodwater
would push through to flood more homes. Two days after the event,
a local newspaper addressed both rumors with the following
statements:
"'Runoff water used to fight the fire is being contained on
the
plant
site,
eliminating
the
threat
of
ground
contamination. ' ... 'There are no chemicals leaking on the
ground or into the water used on the fire. But, just in case
somebody is worried about it, the plant is designed to contain
that water, and its doing just that. ' ... 'Officials from the
EPA and [the state regulatory agency] will continue to monitor
the site for the release of hazardous chemicals.
Chemical
fire experts, including the head of [the corporation's]
firefighting division, have been called in to help with the
cleanup ... ' ... He said the levee holding back the swollen
[local] river was not damaged or weakened by the blast, as
some residents feared.
'We have inspected the levee and it
was unaffected by the blast.
There is no threat of it
breaking,' he said."
Some organizations reported no organizational strain from
responding to both the flood and explosion, but others did.
For
instance, one sizable city fire department reported that their
organization was strained by the flooding event and the explosion
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as they had to call in off-duty people.
There was a lot of
overtime and employees that worked many shifts became fatigued.
The Red Cross and Sheriff's office were reportedly "stretched to
their limits."
VIII.

Conclusions

Secondary hazards after flooding were viewed as real concerns
by responders at this research site.
Overall, everyday planning
and response techniques for hazardous materials incidents were used
as hazards were identified.
Experience with hazardous materials
incidents on a day-to-day basis made these responses not unlike any
other, even though there were flood causes. For example, responses
to some incidents by the state environmental regulatory agency
followed everyday procedures but were carried out with more
quickness and priority. In some cases, responders went to the site
quickly, dealt with the involved party, and found out what
happened, but the response mostly consisted of documenting the
occurrence.
In other cases, an accident was cleaned up or
contained.
In most cases, the response to hazardous materials
problems during flooding did not have a discernable "emergency
period." These were rather small events.
The agencies normally
involved in hazardous materials incidents responded, and other
agencies did not emerge into the picture because of the flooding
aspect. There were no difficulties observed regarding coordination
between agencies.
This study described preparedness and mitigation techniques
that could be employed to lessen the probability of flood-related
hazardous materials incidents.
Underground storage tanks can be
strapped in with steel bands during construction or sandbagged as
heavy rain ensues. oil well fields can be shut in when waters rise
or their on-site tanks can be weighed down.
concerning sewage
hazards, manholes can be built up a few feet so that floodwater
cannot as easily enter municipal sewage systems .
Permitting
standards are used to site landfills away from flood prone areas.
Mitigation for landfills and industrial facilities takes the form
of structural measures to withstand floods up to certain levels.
Regarding the chemical explosion, the potential interaction of
hazardous materials with floodwaters was a concern of officials and
citizens, which also caused it to be addressed through the media.
Overall, the organizational response to the explosion was more
elaborate than the responses to the hazardous materials incidents
caused by flooding, although many of the same groups were involved.
This study identified factors that could facilitate or impede
responses to hazardous materials incidents after flooding. Factors
that facilitated the response were identified by the respondents as
the following:
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* organizational experience and previous lessons learned about
flood
related
hazardous
materials
incidents
often
helped
preparedness and response, as in the cases of underground storage
tanks and oil fields.
* strong legal requirements on
notification ensured reporting
regulatory agencies.

spill reporting and discharge
by parties and response by

* In the airport cleanup and underground storage tank cases, bad
weather had already halted the cleanup contractor's regular work,
so they could devote extra attention to the emergency situations.
* Concerned calls from the public helped in identifying the
transformer problem and the flooding of certain drinking wells.
Respondents also identified factors that can impede response as the
following:

* Accessibility can impede responses to certain incidents,
depending on the nature of the hazard to be investigated.
* Tanks or barrels could topple on industrial sites, oil fields, or
other locations and go unreported.
* Small company owners, such as those who operate oil wells or
underground storage tanks, are often not aware of regulations.
They might also be caught unaware by a flood and not know how to
take precautions.
This study identified new evidence on potential hazards:

* Agents other than flooding, such as incessant rain and high
winds, acted as catalysts in these incidents.
* There is mixed evidence that bad weather can halt or slow down a
hazardous materials cleanup in progress. The effects would depend
on what stage the cleanup had entered.
* Transportation spills, such as barge accidents and highway
hazardous materials spills from trucks, may be more likely in times
of bad weather and flooding.
*

The vehicle oil and gasoline leaks into the floodwaters at the
junkyard presented an unforseen hazard that could be addressed in
future regulations.
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APPENDIX A
Interview Guide
THE FLOODING

1. To begin, could you give me just a brief description of this
agency's response to the flooding that has occurred over the past
few weeks?

2.
Have there been any hazardous materials hazards that have
surfaced during the time of the flooding?

3. Have there been any hazardous materials checks that have taken
place during the flooding? How about after the flooding?
Employees available?
Accessibility?
Authorization?
Equipment?
4.
Have there been any calls or other notifications
hazardous materials during the time of the flood?

about

5. Have there been any rumors or scares about hazardous materials
hazards during the time of the flood?

6. Have there been any problems with the quality of drinking water
during the flood?

7. How have the industries, including the fertilizer plants, been
effected by this flood?

8.
Have there been any problems concerning chemical hazards in
houses, commercial establishments, or industries during this flood?
9.
When do you think the flooding situation will be back to
normal?
1

THE PLANT EXPLOSION
We're also interested in the plant explosion,

10.
Was there been any connection between the flooding and the
explosion of the plant?

11.
Has the explosion exacerbated the flooding situation in any
way?

12.
Was there
explosion?

any

problem

with

chemical

hazards

after

the

13. Was there any testing or checking of floodwaters, air or land
for hazardous materials safety hazards after the explosion?
criterion for safety?
When checked?
What sites checked?
14. Have the resources of this organization been strained between
the two emergencies?

DISASTER EXPERIENCE
The next few questions are about the disasters this community has
undergone in recent history.

15.

What flooding has occurred in the past?

16.

What hazardous materials incidents have occurred in the past?

17.
Has there every been any interaction between flooding and
hazardous materials incidents in the past?
2

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SITES
Now, I'd like to ask you about the hazardous materials sites and
industries that use such materials in this community.

18.
What hazardous materials dump sites are located within your
jurisdiction?
SITE

LOCATION

TYPE

HISTORY

PROBLEMS

1
2

3

4

5

6

19.
20.

Could you point out these sites on this map?
Were any of these sites underwater in the flood?

21.

What industries in this community house hazardous chemicals?

SITE

INDUSTRY NAME

LOCATION

HISTORY

1
2

3

4

5

6

3

TYPE

PROBLEMS

22. What records or documents exist about hazardous materials in
this community?
Superfund sites in the area?
Title III documentation of chemicals housed?
Maps of dump sites?

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS/FLOODING PLANNING
Now I'd like to ask you some questions about emergency planning.

23.

Does this community undertake planning for flooding?

24. Does this community undertake planning for hazardous materials
emergencies?

25.

Could we have a copies of these plans?

26.
Are there areas of the floodplain which contain hazardous
materials? [If so, does that cause any safety hazards?]

27.
Are any precautions for hazardous materials
before floodwaters corne?

sites needed

28. What organizations are involved in hazardous materials tasks
in this community?
1
2
3
4

4

ORGANIZATIONAL

Now we would like to ask for some information about your agency.

29.

How many employees work for this organization?
Divisions?

30.

Is there an organizational chart that I could copy?

31.

Could you describe the chain of command in this agency.

32. Who or what level of the organization makes decisions about
hazardous materials sites?

33. Who or what level of the organization, if any, makes decisions
about flood emergencies?

34.
How does information get passed in this agency?
change during the flood?
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Did that

